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NOTES
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION IN THE
UNIONIZED WORKPLACE:
RECONCILING GILMER,
GARDNER-DENVER AND THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT
No one can be found . . . and . . . no case has . . fallen within
the scope of my researches, in which an agreement to refer a claim
to arbitration, has ever been specifically enforced . . . .
. . • UP has often been said, that the judgment of arbitrators is
but rusticum judicium.
—Justice Joseph Story, Tobey v. County of Bristol'
Justice Story's remarks represent the strong judicial hostility to
arbitration that existed in 1845. 2 Following in the common law tradi-
tion, early American courts guarded their turf ardently and mistrusted
any institution that might rob them of jurisdictions Today, by contrast,
courts are deluged with litigation and are welcoming alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms that might ease their load.' A correspond-
ing willingness to enforce arbitration agreements has replaced the
judiciary's traditional hostility.'
23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065) (Story. J,).
2 LAURA j. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A COURSEBOOK 2 (1994).
5 Id.
4 See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 748-49 (1981) (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting).
5 See id. "Arbitration" refers to a method of resolving disputes by submitting them to the
judgment of one or more neutral persons. See generally FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985 & Supp. 1985-89). Arbitration agreements generally
refer to contracts in which parties have agreed to submit future disputes to arbitral resolution.
Id. Another type of arbitration agreement not discussed in this Note is a contract in which parties
agree to submit an existing dispute to arbitral resolution. Id. Commercial arbitration stems from
a clause in an individually bargained contract and traditionally acts as an alternative to litigation.
Id. Labor arbitration stems from a clause in a collectively bargained contract and traditionally
acts as an alternative to the strike. Id. In this Note labor arbitration is used to mean grievance
arbitration, where an arbitrator interprets or applies the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
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While courts have begun to enforce arbitration agreements with
greater frequency, they have also begun to play a larger role in pro-
tecting the rights of individual employees.6
 In the past thirty years
the number of individual employment rights statutes enforced by the
courts has increased dramatically. 7
 This phenomenon has given rise to
debate on whether actions under individual employment statutes are
appropriate subjects for arbitration.'
Inconsistent statements by the United States Supreme Court on
this issue mix into the debate. In 1973, in Alexander v. Gardner
-Denver
Co., the Supreme Court held that an action under Tide VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was not a proper topic for arbitration. 9 In 1991, in
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Carp., by contrast, the Court held that
an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was a
proper topic for arbitration. 1 °
Also in 1991, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), adding to the number of individual employment statutes
potentially enforceable through arbitration." As part of a national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, Title I of the ADA sets forth specific standards for an
employer dealing with a disabled applicant or employee. 12 In general,
an employer may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified dis-
abled person who can perform the "essential functions" of a job."
Additionally, an employer must make "reasonable accommodation" for
a disabled person to enable that person to perform the essential
functions of a job, unless the employer can show that such accommo-
ment negotiated between a union and employer. Id. Another type of labor arbitration is interest
arbitration, where the arbitrator actually writes the agreement for the parties. Id. Although there
are many similarities in the way the judiciary treats these two types of arbitration (commercial
arbitration and labor arbitration), the two are fundamentally distinct and, at least at the federal
level, derive their legitimacy from separate and unconnected statutes. See infra notes 23-181 and
accompanying text.
6 See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET Al.., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
31, 32-33 (3d ed. 1994).
7 Id. at 32-33.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 23-181.
9 See 415 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1975).
10 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. Prior to 1991, the most comprehensive federal legislation pro-
hibiting disability discrimination was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994).
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 implements affirmative action programs for handicapped persons
at various federal agencies and generally prohibits discrimination by federal employers, contrac-
tors and recipients of federal aid. See id. The ADA is much broader than the Rehabilitation Act
in that it covers all private employers with more than 15 workers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), (5).
15
 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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dation would pose "undue hardship." 14 Determining the meaning and
applicability of such vague terms as "essential functions," "reasonable
accommodation" and "undue hardship" promises to be a source of
conflict for many years to come.''
This Note examines the compatibility of arbitration and the ADA.
Specifically, this Note argues that in the collective bargaining context,
arbitration and the ADA are not only compatible, but also inseparable.
Absent an express collective bargaining agreement provision to the
contrary, 16
 courts should require arbitral resolution before allowing an
employee to file individual suit under the ADA 17
 Under this mecha-
nism, an employee would retain the right to a judicial trial on the
merits following resolution of the claim in arbitration."
Section I traces the history of judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements in both the commercial and labor contexts. 19 Section H
examines the text, legislative history and framework of the ADA and
argues that the ADA passes the judiciary's test for determining statu-
tory arbitrability. 2° Section III discusses the advantages of compelling
arbitration of ADA claims in the collective bargaining context. 21 Sec-
14 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5)(A).
15
 Although courts may be able to borrow meaning for some of the language of the ADA
from Rehabilitation Act precedent, the ADA differs from the Rehabilitation Act in many impor-
tant respects, and the Supreme Court has yet to resolve many issues under the Rehabilitation Act.
ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 6, at 743-44.
113 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960).
The Supreme Court holds that disputes between parties to a collective bargaining agreement are
arbitrable unless the agreement explicitly provides otherwise. See id.; see also infra  text accompa-
nying notes 8I-92.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 81-92. To date, no Court of Appeals has ruled on this
issue. The few district courts that have faced the issue have split. Compare Austin v. Owens-Brock-
way Glass Container, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (W.D. Va. 1994) (employee is estopped from
bringing suit under ADA by collective bargaining provision mandating arbitration of grievances)
With Block v. Art Iron, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 380, 387 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (employee is not required
to arbitrate ADA claims under collective bargaining agreement's arbitration provision) and Claps
v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 141, 147 (D. Conn. 1993) (collective bargaining
agreement cannot as a general matter require an employee to arbitrate individual statutory
claims).
18 Determining the weight to be given the arbitral decision in cases where an employee elects
to reassert statutory rights in court is beyond the scope of this Note. A few possibilities are as
follows: (1) giving the arbitration discretionary evidentiary weight, see Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1973); (2) deferring to the arbitration on issues of fact and collective
bargaining agreement interpretation but only granting it evidentiary weight on other matters, see
id.; and (3) deferring to the arbitration where certain preconditions are met, under a scheme
analogous to the National Labor Relations Board's Spielberg Policy, see Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 23-181.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 182-230.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 231-60.
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tion IV discusses the relationship between Gardner-Denver and com-
pulsory arbitration and argues that courts should not view Gardner-
Denver as a bar to enforcing arbitration agreements under the pro-
posed mechanism."
I. HISTORY
Under the common law, courts would not enforce agreements to
arbitrate future disputes in either the commercial or the labor con-
text." Before 1925, only New York and New Jersey had statutes abro-
gating the common law rule.24
 Congress has since changed the com-
mon law rule, and the judiciary has begun to enforce arbitration
agreements with increasing regularity. 25
A. Commercial Arbitration
Responding to pressures from the business community, in 1925,
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 26 and made com-
mercial arbitration agreements enforceable under federal law. 27 Under
Section 2 of the FAA,
[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction
. . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. 28
FAA Section 1 provides the following exception to Section 2's man-
date: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 28
22 See infra text accompanying notes 261-304.
23 See COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 2, at 2, 4,
21 Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12
MINN. L. REV. 240, 249 (1927).
25 See COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 2, at 4.
26 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
27 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). For a more detailed discussion of the history of the FAA's enactment and the impact of that
history on the arbitration of employment discrimination statutes, see Maria C. Whittaker, Gilmer
v. Interstate: Liberal Policy Favoring Arbitration Trammels Policy Against Employment Discrimination,
56 ALB. L. REV. 273 (1992).
28 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added) (also providing for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
existing disputes).
29 Id. § 1. The meaning of this exception remains unresolved with respect to the enforceabil-
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Since passage of the FAA, the judiciary has spoken considerably
on the scope of its mandate." The Supreme Court first addressed the
issue in 1953, where it interpreted the FAA's mandate very narrowly. 3 '
In with° v. Swan, the Court refused to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment with respect to claims under the Securities Act of 1933 ("'33
Act")." Wilko involved a suit brought by a customer against a securities
brokerage firm to recover damages under the civil liabilities provisions
of the '33 Act," The customer and the firm were bound by a prior
agreement to arbitrate any future disputes arising between them.s 4
 The
Supreme Court decided that the agreement to arbitrate conflicted with
a clause in the '33 Act that provided that "[a]ny condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person . . . to waive compliance with any
provision of [this Act] . shall be void."" The Court determined that
the right to select the judicial forum was a "provision" that the parties
could not legally waive." Reasoning that the statute's guarantees would
not be adequately protected in an arbitral forum, the Court decided
that an agreement to arbitrate constituted a "stipulation" which pur-
ported to "waive compliance" with the Act." The Court, therefore, held
the arbitration agreement void and unenforceable."
In the 1960s, several lower courts followed the Supreme Court's
Wilko rationale and held arbitration agreements unenforceable with
respect to other statutes. 3" In 1968, in American Safety Equipment Corp.
v. JP. Maguire & Co., for example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held an arbitration agreement unenforceable
with respect to Sherman Act claims. 40 In American Safety, a party to a
ity of arbitration clauses in individual employment contracts. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. Although
the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the issue, the Court has implied that the Section
1 exemption does mean that arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements are not
enforceable under the FAA. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40
n.9 (1987); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (finding implicit rejection of the availability of the FAA to enforce arbitration
clauses in collective bargaining agreements in the silent treatment given the FAA by the majority).
xi See infra text accompanying notes 31-77.
31 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
52 Id.
33 Id. at 428,
34 Id. at 429.
a Id. at 430 n.6, 434-35.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
37 1d. at 434-35, 432-33 & n.16.
38 See id. at 434-35, 438.
"Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrability in Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation: The Need for
Amendment, 26 CONN. L. Rev. 521, 527 (1994).
49 391 E2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968). Following the American Safety decision, the Courts of
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license agreement attempted to stay judicial proceedings of a Sherman
Act claim pending arbitration pursuant to the agreement. 4 ' Citing the
Supreme Court's Wilko decision, the American Safety court concluded
that the Sherman Act claims could not be submitted to arbitration."
The court explained that arbitration was inappropriate for resolution
of the Sherman Act claims because of the importance of the statute's
underlying policy goals, the inadequacy of the arbitral forum to decide
complex antitrust issues, and the unequal bargaining position of the
parties when they entered into the license agreement. 43
In 1985, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler
-Plymouth, Inc.,
the Supreme Court departed from its hostility toward the arbitral
forum and held an arbitration agreement enforceable with respect to
Sherman Act claims." Mitsubishi involved an antitrust dispute between
a Japanese corporation and a Puerto Rican corporation that were
bound by a sales agreement containing an arbitration clause." The
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico had ordered
arbitration of the Sherman Act claims pursuant to the FAA." On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed
the order. 47 The First Circuit endorsed the doctrine of American Safety
and held that despite international policy concerns favoring enforce-
ment of the arbitration agreement, the FAA did not require arbitration
of the Sherman Act claims."
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the First Circuit on the arbitration issue.'" The Court began by empha-
sizing the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements and
rejecting the contention that the FAA required a presumption against
the arbitration of statutory claims. 50 The Court explained that outdated
Appeals uniformly held that the rights conferred by the antitrust laws were inappropriate for
enforcement by arbitration. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 620-21 (1985), discussed infra text accompanying notes 44-57. Other courts extended the
rationale to other federal statutes. Abrams, supra note 39 at 529-31.
4] 391 F.2d at 822.
42 Id. at 825, 828.
43 Id. at 826-27, 828. The court also implied that the commercial arbitrators employed to
decide such claims were likely to be from the business community and biased against the customer
whose rights the Sherman Act was intended to protect. Id. at 827.
44
 473 U.S. at 641.
45 Id. at 616-17. Paragraph VI of the Sales Agreement provided: "All disputes, controversies
or differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to . . . this
Agreement or for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration." Id. at 617.
46 Id. at 620.
47 1d. at 623.
49 Id.
49 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 641.
6° Id. at 625. The Court cited several of its own recent decisions that had construed arbitration
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judicial suspicions about the competence of arbitral tribunals should
no longer inhibit the development of arbitration as an alternative
means of dispute resolution. 5 ' The Court also noted that by agreeing
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party was not foregoing the substantive
rights afforded by the statute, but was merely submitting their resolu-
tion to an arbitral, rather than judicial, fortn. 52
The Court next established a two-part test for determining arbi-
trability."A court should initially determine whether the parties' agree-
ment evinced an intent to arbitrate the given dispute; in doing so, the
court should construe the parties' intentions generously in favor of
arbitrability. 54 Next, a court should analyze the text and legislative
history of the statute at issue to determine whether Congress intended
to preclude waiver of the right to a judicial forum." Applying the test
to the facts before it, the Mitsubishi Court determined that it should
enforce the arbitration agreement with respect to the Sherman Act
claims.56
 The Court stated that although it might rule differently in a
purely domestic context, the international policy favoring commercial
arbitration combined with the FAA mandate in this case and dictated
enforcement of the arbitration agreement. 57
agreements liberally, including Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-21 & n.6
(1985), Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr, Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) and
Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 & n.4 (1974). Id. at 625-26. Interestingly, the Court
also cited United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co,, 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960), a
case that established the liberal federal policy of construing labor arbitration clauses, Id. at 626.
51 Id. at 626-27.
52 Id. at 628.
55 1d.
54 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
55 See id. at 627-28.
56 See id. at 628-29.
57 See id. at 629. The Court stated that because international policy concerns dictated en-
forcement of the arbitration agreement, it did not need to decide the legitimacy of the American
Safety doctrine as applied to a purely domestic conflict. Id. After saying so, however, the Court
proceeded to express skepticism toward the American Safety doctrine in eight pages of dicta. Id.
at 632-39. First, the Court stated that absent a clear showing to the contrary, a court should not
assume contracts generating antitrust disputes were necessarily contracts of adhesion. See id. at
632-33. Second, the Court said that the potential complexity of the issues to be decided should
not ward off arbitration, as "adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration." Id.
at 633. Third, the Court said that even though the statute intended the private cause of action
to be a central vehicle for deterring violators, there was no reason to assume arbitration would
not provide an adequate mechanism. See id. at 634-37, The Court explained: "Islo long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,
the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function." Id. at 637. Finally,
the Court said that even though maintenance of the efficacy of the arbitral process required
retaining only minimal judicial review of arbitral awards at the award-enforcement stage, it would
not require intrusive inquiry to establish that the arbitrator acknowledged the Sherman Act claims
and actually decided diem. Id. at 638.
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In 1987, the Court extended the rationale of Mitsubishi to a do-
mestic dispute in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, where it
held an arbitration agreement enforceable with respect to claims un-
der the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("'34 Act") and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO" ). 5B McMahon in-
volved a suit brought by customers against their brokerage firm." The
customers had entered into prior agreements with the firm providing
for arbitration of any controversy relating to their accounts. 6° Citing
Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court explained that the FAA mandated en-
forcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims unless Congress
had evinced a contrary intent. 6 ' The Court stated that such intent
would be deducible from the statute's text or legislative history, or from
an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying
framework and purposes. 62
Addressing the '34 Act claims, the Court first said that it did not
infer a congressional intent to preclude waiver of a judicial forum from
the text of the statute.° Although noting that the '34 Act contained
an antiwaiver provision virtually identical to the '33 Act's antiwaiver
provision at issue in Wilko, the Court stated that Wilko's reasoning was
only applicable to cases where arbitration was inadequate to protect a
party's substantive rights. 64
 The Court then rejected the customers'
contention that arbitration would weaken their ability to recover under
the statute. 65
 The Court stated that even if Wilko's assumptions about
the inadequacy of arbitration were valid in 1953, they did not hold true
in 1987. 66
The McMahon Court next refused to infer congressional intent
from the statute's legislative history. 67
 The Conference Report accom-
panying a recent amendment to the '34 Act provided that "this amend-
ment [does] not change existing law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan
58
 482 U.S. 220, 238, 239, 242 (1987). The Court stated that although the holding in
Mitsubishi was limited to the international context, much of its reasoning was equally applicable
to the case at hand. Id. at 239.
55 Id. at 223.
em Id.
61
 Id. at 226-27.
62
 Id. at 227.
63 See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227-28. Section 29(a) of the '34 Act declares void — [ajny
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision
of" the Act. Id. at 227.
64 See id. at 228-29.
65 1d. at 231.
66 See id. at 233.
67 See id. at 236-37.
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. . concerning the effect of arbitration proceeding provisions in
agreements entered into by [customers] . "68
 Despite the report's appar-
ent facial clarity, the Court concluded that an intent of the conferees
to preclude arbitration was not deducible from this language. 69 The
Court explained the many inherent difficulties in inferring congres-
sional intent from legislative history and concluded that if Congress
had intended to extend Wilko to the '34 Act, it would have included
such a provision in the law itself." Thus, determining that neither text
nor legislative history supported a contrary congressional intent, the
Court ordered arbitration of the '34 Act claims."
With respect to the RICO claims, the McMahon Court similarly
found no support in either text or legislative history to support a
holding against arbitrability. 72
 The Court then analyzed the policies
underlying RICO and concluded that there was no inherent conflict
between those policies and arbitration." Following the reasoning of
Mitsubishi, the Court decided that because the customers could effec-
tively vindicate their rights in an arbitral forum, the RICO claims
should be arbitrated in accordance with the arbitration agreement. 74
Finally, in 1989, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc., the Supreme Court overruled Wilko and held an arbitration
agreement enforceable with respect to '33 Act claims." The Court
explained that Wilko had "fallen far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring [arbitration]" and that
resort to the arbitral process would not undermine any of the substan-
tive rights afforded under the statute." Accordingly, the Court en-
forced the parties' agreement and ordered arbitration of the statutory
claims."
Thus, between 1953 and 1989, the judiciary's approach to enforc-
ing commercial arbitration agreements underwent dramatic change.
In the past, courts following Wilko rejected enforcement for reasons of
the importance of a statute's underlying policy goals, the inadequacy
68 McMahan, 482 U.S. at 236-37.
69 See id. at 237-38.
7° See id.
7 ' Id. at 238. Apparently the customers did not argue, and the Court did not address, the
compatibility of arbitration with the underlying purposes of the '34 Act. See id. at 238-39.
12 Id. at 238. The Court stated that unlike the '34 Act, nothing in RICO's text or legislative
history even arguably evinced a congressional intent to preclude waiver of a judicial forum. Id.
18 McMahan, 482 U.S. at 239.
74 See id. at 242.
15 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
16 Id. at 481, 486.
77 /d. at 486.
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of the arbitral forum, and the relative bargaining position of the parties
to the agreement."' In three 1980s decisions, however, the Supreme
Court invalidated these reasons as grounds for refusing to compel
arbitration of statutory claims. 79 Under the current standard, a court
must order arbitration of statutory claims in accordance with a com-
mercial arbitration agreement unless it can deduce a congressional
intent to preclude arbitration from the statute's text, its legislative
history, or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the
statute's framework or underlying purposes. 8°
B. Labor Arbitration
While the enforceability of commercial arbitration agreements
gained judicial acceptance, the enforceability of labor arbitration
agreements developed under separate doctrine. In 1947, in an effort
to promote industrial stabilization, Congress enacted the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act CLMRA"), indicating approval of arbitration as
a method of resolving labor disputes." In 1957, in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, the United States Supreme Court interpreted Section
301 of the LMRA82 as granting courts power to enforce specific provi-
sions in collective bargaining agreements.83 In Lincoln Mills, a union
sought to compel arbitration of a grievance pursuant to an arbitra-
tion clause in its collective bargaining agreement." The Court rea-
soned that Section 301 gave it both jurisdiction to hear the suit and
authority to create a federal common law to govern the suit. 85 The
Court then ordered arbitration, thereby establishing the enforceability
28 See Abrams, supra note 39.
79 Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 477; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 614 (1985).
1343 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
81 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994). Section 203(d) provides: "Final adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargain-
ing agreement.' 29 U.S.G. § 173(d) (1994); see United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 574, 578 (1960).
82 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994). Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
Id.
85 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
84 Id. at 449.
85 See id. at 451, 456.
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of collectively bargained arbitration agreements under federal com-
mon law.86
The Supreme Court further developed the common law in 1960,
in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., where it held
that courts should liberally enforce arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements." In Warrior & Gulf, a union sued to compel
arbitration of a grievance pursuant to the arbitration provision in the
parties' collective bargaining agreement. 88
 The employer had refused
to arbitrate, arguing that the particular grievance was not proper for
arbitration." The Court began its discussion by distinguishing labor
arbitration from commercial arbitration and by emphasizing the strong
federal policy in favor of peaceful resolution of labor disputes." The
Court explained that the judicial hostility to commercial arbitration
evinced in Wilko had no applicability in the labor context.gi The Court
then rejected the employer's argument that the grievance was inarbi-
trable and held that a court should deem a grievance arbitrable unless
the agreement contained an express provision to the contrary. 92
Despite the liberal policy toward enforcement articulated in War-
rior & Guy; and in contrast to its treatment of commercial arbitration
agreements, the Supreme Court has never enforced a collectively bar-
gained arbitration agreement with respect to statutory claims. In 1974,
in the seminal case Alexander v. Gardner
-Denver Co., the Supreme Court
pronounced that arbitration was an inadequate forum for final adju-
dication of Title VII rights." The Gardner-Denver Court held that an
employee had a statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") notwithstanding prior submission
86 Id. at 451. In dissent, Justice Frankfurter sharply criticized the majority's holding as
contrary to the common law precedent of denying enforcement of executory agreements to
arbitrate. See id. at 467. He reasoned that if the FAA were necessary to grant courts power to
enforce commercial arbitration agreements, a congressional act specifically granting courts the
power to enforce labor arbitration agreements should likewise be required. Id. at 466-67. He
noted that by not enforcing the collective bargaining agreement under the FAA, the majority
gave implicit approval to the view that Section l 's exemption for employment contracts covered
collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 466.
"363 U.S. 574,583 (1960).
8° Id. at 577.
39
 Id. The employer had argued that the substance of the grievance, the company's decision
to contract out work, was a matter strictly the function of management and was not subject to
arbitration. Id.
9° Id. at 577-78.
91 Id. at 578. Warrior
	 Gulf was decided seven years after Wart, long before the Supreme
Court had overcome its hostility to commercial arbitration in the 1980s.
92
 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 584-85.
99 415 U.S. 36,56 (1974).
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of his claim to arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a
collective bargaining agreement."
The dispute in Gardner-Denver centered around an employer's
termination of a black drill operator for allegedly producing too many
defective parts. 95 The employee filed a grievance pursuant to the col-
lective bargaining agreement, asserting that the employer had dis-
charged him without just cause. 96 His grievance made no explicit claim
of racial discrimination." The union processed the employee's griev-
ance under the agreement's multistep grievance machinery 98 In the
final prearbitration step, the employee raised a new claim and charged
that his discharge had been the result of racial discrimination. 99
At the arbitration hearing, the employee testified that the em-
ployer had discharged him because of his race, that the employer had
retained other, nonblack workers who had produced the same or
greater number of defective parts, and that the employee felt he could
not rely on the union. 100 The arbitrator decided in favor of the em-
ployer, ruling that the employer had discharged the employee for just
cause; the arbitrator made no reference to the employee's allegation
of racial discrimination.'°' The employee then filed suit under Title
vll . lo2
94 Id. at 49.
95 Id. at 38.
96 Id. at 39. Under Article 4 of the agreement, the company retained the right to hire,
suspend or discharge [employees] for proper cause." Id. Article 23, § 6(a) provided that "[ri]e
employee will be discharged, suspended or given a written warning notice except for just cause."
Id.
97 Id.
96 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 42. The agreement contained a five-step grievance procedure
culminating in compulsory arbitration for unresolved disputes as to the meaning and application
of the provisions in the agreement. Id. at 40-41 n.3. The company and the union were to select
and pay the arbitrator, and the arbitrator's decision was to be "final and binding upon the
company, the union, and any employee or employees involved." Id. at 41-42.
99 See id. at 42. Article 5, § 2 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement provided that
"there shall be no discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or ancestry." Id. at 39. Prior to the arbitration hearing, the employee had also
filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which referred
the complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. at 42.
It'° See id. at 42. The union representative also testified that the company's usual practice was
to transfer unsatisfactory drill operators back to their former positions rather than discharge
them. Id.
101 Id. at 42. The arbitrator stated that there was insufficient evidence of a practice of
transferring, rather than discharging, unsatisfactory drill operators, but suggested that the com-
pany and union confer on whether such an arrangement would be workable in the present case.
Id. at 43. Contemporaneously, the EEOC determined that there was not reasonable cause to
believe a violation of Title VII had occurred and informed the employee of his right to file suit
in federal court. Id.
"Id. at 43.
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The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
dismissed the suit, finding that the claim of racial discrimination had
been submitted to the arbitrator and resolved in favor of the em-
ployer.m The district court held that because the employee had volun-
tarily elected to pursue his grievance to arbitration under the nondis-
crimination clause of the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitral
decision precluded him from bringing suit under Title VII.'" The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court ruling)°
Upon writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed.m The Court began by discussing the policies underlying the
detailed enforcement provisions of Title VII. 1 °7
 The Court noted that
although Title VII did not specifically address the relationship between
federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective
bargaining agreements, Title VII's enforcement scheme in no way
suggested that a prior arbitral decision would foreclose an individual's
right to file suit. 1 °8
 The Court stated that individual rights guaranteed
by Title VII were different from collective rights guaranteed by the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and were not subject to pro-
spective waiver. 109
 The Court stated that although an employee could
presumably waive his cause of action under Title VII as part of a
voluntary settlement, the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement was not a voluntary settlement, and the submission to
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement could in no event
constitute a binding waiver of an employee's Title VII rights.""
The Court next rejected the view that permitting an employee
both an arbitral and a judicial forum was unfair to the employer.'" The
Court explained that in instituting a suit under Title VII the employee
was not seeking judicial review of the arbitrator's decision on the
1 " Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 43. The Court relied on the employee's deposition acknow-
ledging that he had raised the issue of racial discrimination at the arbiu -al hearing. Id. at 45 n.4.




 See id. at 44-45.
"Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 47. The Court further explained that the employee's actual
submission of the grievance to arbitration did not alter the situation. Id. at 52.
"Id. at 51-52. Certain rights guaranteed by the NLRA, such as the right to strike, are subject
to prospective waiver by the union negotiating the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
for the individual employees it represents. See id.
11 °M. at 52 & n.15.
111 /d. at 54. Both the district and appeals courts had reasoned that allowing the employee
two forums to try his claim was unfair because it meant that only the employer was bound by the
arbitral decision. Id.
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contract's nondiscrimination claim, but was asserting a right of inde-
pendent legal origin. 112 The employer did not have access to the judi-
cial forum only because Title VII did not confer any rights on the
employer. 1 l 3
Finally, the Court explained that allowing an employee a judicial
forum would not undermine the parties' incentive to arbitrate. 114 The
Court explained that the independent advantages of an arbitration
clause, namely the union's corresponding agreement not to strike, and
the arbitral forum's potential for expeditious dispute resolution, would
remain, regardless of an employee's right to sue following an arbitral
award."' These alone, explained the Court, would provide adequate
incentive to arbitrate." 6 In sum, the Court concluded that Title VII's
purposes and procedures strongly suggested that an individual did not
waive a private cause of action by submitting a grievance to arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement." 7
The Gardner-Denver Court went on to reject the company's pro-
posal for a deferral rule, explaining that deferral to arbitration would
be inconsistent with Congress's intent to give federal courts final re-
sponsibility for enforcement of Title VII." 6 The company had proposed
that a court should defer to a prior arbitration award where: (i) the
claim was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective bargaining agree-
ment prohibited the form of discrimination charged in the Title VII
suit; and (iii) the arbitrator had authority to rule on the claim and to
fashion a remedy.' I° The Court reasoned that arbitration was a com-
paratively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of Title VII
rights.' 20 The Court explained that because an arbitrator's role is to
effectuate the intent of the parties, not the intent of enacted legisla-
112 Id. at 54. The Court explained that the employee's rights under the collective bargaining
agreement were distinctly separate from his rights under the statute and that this separate nature
was not vitiated merely because both were violated in the same factual occurrence. Id. at 50. The
Court next offered a lengthy discussion on the role of the arbitrator in the system of industrial
self-government. Id. at 52-53. The Court explained that the arbitrator's source of authority is the
collective bargaining agreement and that the arbitrator has no general authority to invoke public
laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties. Id. at 53. The arbitrator's authority to
resolve questions of contractual rights remains, regardless of whether certain contractual rights
are similar to, or duplicative of, the substantive rights secured by Title VII. Id. at 53-54.
115 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 54.
"4 1d.
115 Id. at 54-55.
" 6 1d. at 55.
1 L 7 Id. at 49.
"415 U.S. at 55-55.
lig Id. The Court noted that this proposal was analogous to the NLRB's policy of deferring
to arbitral decisions on statutory issues. Id. at 56 n.17; see also Spielberg Mfg, Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080,1082 (1955).
120 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56.
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Lion, an arbitrator would be compelled to apply the agreement over
the statute in situations where the two were incompatible.m The Court
further explained that because arbitrators were competent in the law
of the shop, not the law of the land, arbitrators were ill-equipped to
interpret and apply statutory language. 122 The procedure used in the
arbitration was also less appropriate than judicial procedure for final
resolution of Tide VII issues.'" Finally, the Court expressed concern
over the union's exclusive control over the manner and extent to which
an individual's grievance was presented.'" The Court suggested that
the union might not adequately represent an individual's Tide VII
rights because in the collective bargaining context an individual's
rights were often subverted to the collective interests of all in the
bargaining unit. 125
The Court also rejected the adoption of a more demanding de-
ferral standard.'" The Court explained that a standard that adequately
ensured effectuation of Tide VII rights in the arbitral forum would
tend to make arbitration procedurally complex, expensive and time-
consuming.' 27 The Court reasoned, therefore, that any minimal savings
in time and expense gained by such a deferral standard would not
121 M. at 56-57.
122 Id. at 57. The Court noted that the broad language of Title VII, which required reference
to public law concepts, was especially suited to judicial construction. Id.
•	 123 Id. at 57-58. The Court pointed out that the factfinding processes of arbitration were not
equivalent to judicial factfinding. Id. at 57. The record of the proceeding is not as complete, the
usual rules of evidence do not apply, and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as
discovery, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.
Id. at 57-58. Arbitrators are also not required to give the reasons for an award. Id. at 58.
124 Id. at 58 n.19.
125 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19.
126 h/. at 58. In a footnote, the Court gave an example of such a more demanding standard
by citing to the standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co. Id. at 58 n.20
(citing 467 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1972)). The Rios court had set forth the following deferral
standard:
First, there may be no deference to the decision of the arbitrator unless the
contractual right coincides with rights under Title VII. Second, it must be plain that
the arbitrator's decision is in no way violative of the private rights guaranteed by
Title VII, nor of the public policy which inheres in Title VII. In addition, before
deferring, the district court must be satisfied that (1) the factual issues before it are
identical to those decided by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitrator had power under the
collective agreement to decide the ultimate issue of discrimination; (3) the evidence
presented at the arbitral hearing dealt adequately with all factual issues; (4) the
arbitrator actually decided the factual issues presented to the court; (5) the arbitra-
tion proceeding was fair and regular and free of procedural infirmities. The burden
of proof in establishing these conditions of limitation will be upon the respondent
as distinguished from the claimant.
467 F.2d at 58.
127 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59. The Court reasoned that judicial enforcement of such a
rigorous standard would almost require a de novo review on the merits. Id.
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justify the risk to vindication of Title VII rights.' 28
 The Court did state,
however, that the award could be admitted as evidence at trial.' 29 In a
final footnote, the Court explained that although the weight to be
accorded the arbitral decision should be decided on a case by case
basis in the trial court's discretion, relevant factors included the simi-
larity of provisions in the collective bargaining agreement with provi-
sions of Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral
forum, the adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of discrimi-
nation, and the special competence of particular arbitrators.'" The
Court further explained that where an arbitrator gives complete con-
sideration of an individual's Title VII rights, a court may give the
decision great weight; this is "especially true where the issue is solely
one of fact. "131
In sum, the Gardner-Denver Court held that an employee does not
lose his statutory cause of action under Title VII by submitting a claim
to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. 152 The Court
reasoned that both the policies behind Title VII and the nature of the
arbitral process compelled such a conclusion.'" Thus, under Gardner-
Denver, a court should grant an employee bringing a Title VII charge
a full trial on the merits, affording a prior arbitral award evidentiary
weight as it deems proper. 134
In 1981, in Barrentine v. Arkansas
-Best Freight System, Inc., the
Supreme Court extended the rationale of Gardner-Denver to claims
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").'" The Barrentine Court
held that prior submission of employees' wage disputes to the griev-
ance procedure in a collective bargaining agreement did not foreclose
suit under the FLSA.'" The Court stated that despite the general
128 1d. The Court speculated that such a deferral rule might also adversely affect the arbitra-
tion system by encouraging employees to bypass arbitration and institute suit. Id. The result would
be more litigation, not less. Id.
129 Id. at 60.
129 Id. at 60 n.21.
131 Id.
132 415 U.S, at 56.
333 See id.
134
 Id. at 60.
335
 450 U.S. 728, 745-46 (1981).
Id. The employee truckdrivers filed grievances when their employer did not compensate
them for certain pretrip time spent inspecting their trucks. Id. at 730-31. The employees' union
presented these grievances to a joint grievance committee pursuant to the grievance machinery
of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 731. The employees alleged that they were entitled
to compensation according to the compensation clause in their collective bargaining agreement,
which provided that truckdrivers be compensated for all time spent in the service of the
Employer." Id. at 730-32. The joint grievance committee rejected the employees' grievances
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federal policy of deferring to collectively bargained dispute resolution
procedures, not all disputes were suited for such resolution.'" The
Court disagreed that the FLSA claims were particularly suited for
arbitration, even though they were based on wage and hour disputes,
topics admittedly at the heart of the collective bargaining process.'"
Relying on the rationale of Gardner-Denver, the Court explained that
arbitration was inappropriate for claims based on statutes designed to
provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers. 199 The
Court explained that in contrast to the LMRA, which was designed to
promote the collective interests of employees, the FLSA was designed
to give specific minimum protections to individual workers. 14° Finally,
echoing the reasoning of Gardner-Denver, the Court described how the
arbitral process might not adequately protect those individual rights.' 4 '
The Barrentine Court concluded that an individual's FLSA rights were
best protected in a judicial, rather than an arbitral, forum and that
they were not foreclosed by prior submission to contractual dispute
resolution procedures."'
without explanation. Id. at 731. According to the collective bargaining agreement, the joint
grievance committee's ruling was to be final and binding on both parties. Id. at 731 n.5.
After their grievances were dismissed, the employees filed suit in federal district court
alleging that they were entitled to compensation under the FLSA. Id. at 731-33. A detailed
description of the provisions of the FLSA is beyond the scope of this Note. Relevant to this Note
is only that the employees alleged that the same set of facts entitled them to certain rights under
both their collective bargaining agreement and the FLSA. Id.
137 Id. at 737.
"8 Id. at 738.
mid. at 737. The Court did note that the FLSA contained some exceptions for employers
where provisions in a collective bargaining agreement provided for compensation schemes dif-
ferent from those provided in the FLSA. Id. at 741-42 n.19. Where an employee's claim depended
on application of one of those exceptions, the Court stated it "assumed without deciding" that a
court should defer to a prior arbitral decision construing the relevant provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. As the claim before it did not involve application of one of the
exceptions, deference to the prior arbitral decision would be inappropriate. Id.
140 Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739. The Court cited its own decisions interpreting the FLSA that
emphasized the nonwaivable nature of an individual employee's rights to fair compensation. Id.
at 740-41. The Court also noted Congress's intent to achieve a uniform national policy of
compensation through passage of the FLSA. Id. at 741.
141 Id. at 742. The Court explained the following: first, a union might enable an individual's
statutorily granted wage and hour benefits to be sacrificed in exchange for increased benefits for
workers in the bargaining unit as a whole; second, an arbitrator might not be competent to
determine the meaning and application of the FLSA, the interpretation of which involved
resolving complex questions of law and fact based on public law considerations, in light of
volumes of legislative history and over four decades of legal interpretation and administrative
rulings; third, an arbitrator might not have the authority to determine the statutory claim or to
grant the aggrieved employees as broad a range of relief. Id. at 742-43.
142 Id. at 745. In dissent, ChiefJustice Burger criticized the majority's holding for moving the
law in a direction counter to the needs and interests of workers and employers and contrary to
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In 1984, in McDonald v. City of West Branch, the Supreme Court
extended the rationale of Gardner
-Denver and Barrentine to actions
brought under § 1983. 143 In McDonald, an arbitrator ruled against an
employee who claimed he had been discharged without just cause.'"
Rather than appeal the arbitral award, the employee filed suit under
§ 1983, alleging that the employer had discharged him for exercising
his First Amendment rights."' Reiterating the rationale of Gardner-Den-
ver, the McDonald Court held that § 1983 was intended to protect
individuals' federal statutory and constitutional rights and that arbitra-
tion was an inadequate forum for protection of those rights."' Thus,
under Gardner
-Denver and its progeny, an individual employee is enti-
tled to a judicial trial de novo following arbitral disposition of collective
bargaining agreement rights that parallel rights under a federal em-
ployment statute."7
C. Gilmer
To date, the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue raised
in this Note: whether a court may compel arbitration of statutory
claims pursuant to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.
In contrast to the commercial arbitration cases, which were brought in
order to compel arbitration, Gardner-Denver and its progeny all arose
after arbitration had taken place."' Recently, the Supreme Court
handed down a decision that may serve to fill this gap and to bridge
the doctrines of commercial and labor arbitration. 149
the interests of the judicial system. Id. at 746. Although agreeing that an individual's FLSA rights
were unwaivable, he did not agree that limiting vindication of those rights to an arbitral forum
amounted to a waiver of those rights. Id. at 746-47. He explained that the reasons for favoring
arbitration were wise and obvious: litigation is costly and time consuming, and judges are less
adapted to the nuances of the disputes that typically arise in shops and factories than traditional
ad hoc panels of facffinders. Id. at 747. He distinguished the Title VII rights issue in Gardner-
Denver from the FLSA rights at issue here and explained that there was a vast difference between
resolving allegations of racial discrimination and settling a simple wage dispute. Id. at 749-50.
Title VII, he explained, was aimed at eradicating discrimination long practiced by employers and
unions. Id. at 750. Whereas deferral to arbitral decisions reached by the same combination of
forces that had long perpetuated invidious discrimination would be like making "the foxes
guardians of the chickens," this, he explained, was not a discrimination rase. Id.
' 43 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984). The Court explained that § 1983 prohibits state actors from
denying persons their constitutional and statutory rights. Id. at 290. The employee in McDonald
was a police officer, employed by the city. Id. at 285.
144
 Id. at 286.
145 /d.
146 Id. at 289-91.
147
 See supra text accompanying notes 93-147.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 93-147.
349 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
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In 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme
Court held an arbitration agreement enforceable with respect to an
individual employee's claims under the Age Discrimination and Em-
ployment Act ("ADEA").'" In Gilmer, a registered securities repre-
sentative sued his employer, alleging that he had been terminated in
violation of the ADEA.I'l The employer moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration clause in the employee's registration appli-
cation to the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), which the employee
had signed as a condition of his employment. 152
 The United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the
employer's motion based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Gardner-
Denver and because it found that Congress intended to preclude waiver
of a judicial forum for ADEA claims. 15". The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding nothing in the text,
legislative history or underlying purposes of the ADEA indicating that
Congress intended to preclude such a waiver.'" On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's ruling.'"
The Supreme Court began its discussion by stressing the liberal
federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements under the FAA.'"
Citing Mitsubishi, McMahon and Rodriguez, the Court explained that
statutory claims could be subject to arbitration pursuant to an arbitra-
tion agreement enforceable under the FAA.'" The Court then restated
its test for determining whether Congress intended to preclude waiver
of a judicial forum, and explained that in applying this test it would
150 Id.
151 Id. at 23-24. The employee also filed charges with the EEOC. Id. at 23.
152 Id. at 24. The application provided that the employee "agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute,
claim or controversy" arising between him and his employer "that is required to be arbitrated
under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with which [he] register[ed]." Id.
at 23. The NYSE rules provided for arbitration of "[a]ny controversy between a registered
representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or
termination of employment of such registered representative." id. In its motion, the employer
relied upon the mandate of the FAA. Id. at 24.
153 Id.
154 Gamer, 500 U.S. at 24.
155 Id. at 23.
156 id, at 24-25.
157 Id. at 26. The Court declined to rule on whether § 1 of the FAA excluded all contracts of
employment from the FAA mandate, See id. at 25 n.2. The Court stated that it did not need to
resolve the issue because the arbitration agreement was included in a registration application,
not a contract with the employer. Id. The Court also pointed out that the employee had not raised
the issue in the courts below. Id. The Court noted that lower courts addressing the issue had
uniformly held that arbitration clauses contained in registration applications were not covered
by § l's exemption. Id. The Court said it left for another day the issue of the scope of § l's
exemption with respect to agreements between employees and their employer. Id.
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resolve questions of arbitrability with a liberal policy favoring arbitra-
tion. 158
The Court then decided that arbitration was not inconsistent with
the statutory framework and purposes of the ADEA.'" First, the Court
rejected the argument that arbitration would somehow undermine the
role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in
enforcing the ADEA. 1 " The Court explained that the mere involve-
ment of an administrative agency in the enforcement of a statute was
not sufficient to preclude arbitration, and that the employee would still
be able to file a charge with the EEOC even though he could not bring
a private action.' 6' Second, the Court stated that arbitration was an
adequate forum to further the important social policies underlying the
ADEA) 62
 Third, the Court explained that arbitration was consistent
with the flexible approach provided by Congress for resolution of
ADEA claims.I 63
The Court next rejected the employee's arguments on the proce-
dural inadequacies of arbitration.'" The Court did not agree that the
limited discovery in arbitration would make it too difficult to demon-
strate discrimination)" The Court reasoned that demonstrating dis-
crimination required no more discovery than demonstrating RICO or
antitrust violations, both of which were subject to arbitration)" The
Court also disagreed that allowing arbitrators to decide ADEA claims
would stifle the development of the law. 167 The Court explained that
although arbitration often did not produce a written opinion detailing
the reasoning behind an award, the same was true in voluntary settle-
ments of ADEA claims, which Congress obviously did not intend to
preclude.'" Moreover, the Court explained that courts would still issue
158 1d. at 28-29.
159 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27. The employee had conceded that nothing in the text or legislative
history of the ADEA precluded arbitration. Id. at 26.
160 1d. at 28-29.
161 Id. The Court analogized to the SEC's involvement in enforcement of the '33 Act and the
'34 Act, both of which were enforceable by arbitration. Id. at 29.
162 1d. Citing Mitsubishi, the Court explained that as long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate his or her statutory claim in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve
both its remedial and deterrent functions. Id. at 28.
165 1d. at 29. The Court explained that the EEOC is directed to pursue informal methods of
conciliation, conference and persuasion for resolution of ADEA claims and that claimants have
the right to select either state or federal court to pursue these claims. Id.
164 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32. The Court stated that because it had already rejected these
arguments in many prior cases it would only address them briefly. Id. at 30.
165 1d. at 31.
'MId.
167 1d. at 31-32.
168 Id. at 32. The Court also noted that NYSE rules required arbitral awards to be in writing.
Id. at 31.
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opinions, as not all litigants were likely bound by arbitration agree-
ments.' 69 Finally, the Court rejected the notion that the often unequal
bargaining power between the parties to an arbitration agreement in
the employment context should rule against enforcement of such
agreements.'" According to the Court, mere inequality in bargaining
power was not a sufficient reason to hold arbitration agreements un-
enforceable in the employment context."'
Finally, the Gilmer Court addressed and distinguished Gardner-
Denver."' The Court explained that Gardner-Denver did not involve the
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims, but the
separate issue of whether an arbitral award precluded subsequent
judicial resolution of the claims.'" The Gilmer Court reasoned that the
arbitration agreement at issue in Gardner
-Denver had not precluded
judicial resolution because the employees there had not agreed to
arbitrate statutory claims and the arbitrator was not authorized to
resolve such claims."' The Gilmer Court further explained that the
tension between collective representation and individual rights at issue
in Gardner-Denver was not present in the case at hand.'" Lastly, the
Court stated that Gardner-Denver and its progeny were decided under
the LMRA, not the FAA, and that the FAA strongly favored arbitra-
tion.'" Accordingly, Gardner-Denver was not a bar to enforcement of
the arbitration agreement in the case at hand.'"
Following Gilmer, there has been considerable debate on the ar-
bitrability of employment statutes in both the commercial and labor
contexts.'" Much of this debate focuses on whether employment con-
tracts and collective bargaining agreements are exempt from the FAA's
mandate under the statute's exemption of "contracts of employ-
ment."'" Resolution of this debate does not necessarily determine the
enforceability of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agree-
ments, however, as federal courts have the authority to fashion a com-
mon law under LMRA section 301 independent of FAA jurispru-
169 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
17° Id. at 33.
171 Id.
172 /d. at 33-35.
I" Id. at 35.




1714 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 39; R. Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law:
Individual Autonomy and Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 Hous. L.
REV. 1863 (1993); Whittaker, supra note 27, at 273.
tn See supra note 29 (discussing this debate).
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dence.'" The Supreme Court has never determined whether section
301 empowers courts to compel an employee to arbitrate a statutory
claim before being allowed to file suit.'" This Note argues that absent
an express agreement provision to the contrary, courts should compel
such arbitration.
IL INFERRING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
As a threshold matter, the ADA passes the test prescribed by the
Supreme Court for determining arbitrability in the commercial con-
text.'" Although a court enforcing an arbitration agreement under
section 301 would not be bound to analyze a statute in accordance with
FAA precedent, historically such precedent has had great influence on
the common law of labor arbitration.'" To the extent that courts would
find the ADA arbitrable in the commercial context, therefore, such a
determination would support a finding of arbitrability in the labor
context.'"
A. The ADA's Text and Legislative History
The text of the ADA'" and the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
("CRA"), which amends the ADA,' 86 both encourage arbitration as an
alternative method of dispute resolution.'" Section 513 of the ADA
provides: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law,
the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including . . . arbi-
tration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this Act."'"
Section 118 of the CRA similarly provides: "Where appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes
arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by [this
180 See supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
181 Gardner-Denver, Barrentine and McMahan all involved the issue of what effect to give an
arbitral proceeding that had already occurred. See supra notes 93-147 and accompanying text.
182 See infra text accompanying notes 185-230.
188 See United Paperworkers Intl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (noting
that the courts have often looked to interpretations of the FAA for guidance in labor arbitration
cases, "especially in the wake of the holding that Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act ... empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern suits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.").
184 see id.
I 85 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
188 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
187
 42 U.S.C. § 12212; Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 18, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (codified in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
188 42 U.S.C. § 12212.
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Act]." 1 " This language supports the notion that Congress did not
intend to preclude courts from compelling arbitration before allowing
an employee access to court.'"
The ADA's legislative history is less clear on this issue. 191 The
House Judiciary Committee Report to the ADA states that the alterna-
tive dispute mechanisms encouraged in section 513 would supplement,
not supplant, the remedies provided in the Act. 19" The Report states
that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether
in a collectively bargained or an individual employment contract,
would not preclude the affected person from seeking judicial relief
under the enforcement provisions of the Act. 1 " The Conference Re-
port adopts by reference the Judiciary Committee Report's statement
on section 513, and states that "[u]nder no condition would an arbi-
tration clause in a collective bargaining agreement or employment
contract prevent an individual from pursuing their rights under the
ADA."'"
The legislative history of the CRA is similar to that of the ADA,
although even less conclusive.'" On one hand, a two-part Report of
the House Education and Labor Committee and the House Judiciary
Committee' echoes the House Judiciary Committee Report on the
ADA: 197
[T]he Committee believes that any agreement to submit dis-
puted issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a col-
lective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract,
does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief
under the enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is
consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title
189 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 18, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 12212; Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 18, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (codified in
scattered sections of U.S.C.).
191 See infra notes 192-204.
192 H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 499; see also 136 CONG. Rm. H2616 (1990) (remarks of Rep. Glickman) (noting that ADA
bill "establishes an important principle that we ought to try to avoid litigation ... if possible, and
that encouraging dispute resolution between the parties is a positive idea").
193 See H.R. REP. No. 485(111), supra note 192, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 499-500.
194 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., iepiinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 598.
195 See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
196 H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter HRI], H.R. REP. No. 40(II),
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter HRH], reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 694, respec-
tively.
197 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
502	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 37:479
VII in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. . . The Committee
does not intend [such alternative methods] to preclude rights
and remedies that would otherwise be available.t 98
On the other hand, interpretive memoranda placed on the record
by Senator Robert Dole and Representative Henry Hyde during
consideration of the issue, in identical language, indicate their
support for final and binding arbitration:' 9°
This provision encourages the use of alternative means of
dispute resolution, including binding arbitration, where the
parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods.
In light of the litigation crisis facing this county and the
increasing sophistication and reliability of alternatives to liti-
gation, there is no reason to disfavor the use of such fo-
rums.wo
In contrast to the House Report, which cites Gardner-Denver with
approval, these memoranda cite Gilmer with approval. 20'
On the whole, the ADA's text and legislative history are inconclu-
sive as to congressional intent on compulsory arbitration. 202 The text
strongly encourages the use of arbitration, but it does not compel it. 20'
The legislative history indicates a congressional intent to preserve
access to a judicial forum, but it does not indicate whether Congress
would view compulsory arbitration as an impermissible obstacle to that
access.204
Courts facing this issue should decide that Congress would not
view compulsory arbitration as an impermissible obstacle to judicial
access. Courts should construe the textual encouragement of arbitra-
tion broadly because Congress passed the CRA six months after the
Supreme Court decided Gitmer. 205 Although Senator Dole's and Rep-
I" HRI, supra note 196, HRII, supra note 196, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 635, 735,
respectively. The House Committee on Education and Labor had actually rejected the Republican
version of the bill, which would have encouraged the use of arbitration in place of judicial
resolution, reasoning that such a rule would fly in the face of Supreme Court decisions holding
that workers have a right to go to court to resolve important statutory and constitutional rights.
HR1, supra note 196, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 642.
I" See 137 CONG. REC. S15,478 (statement of Sen. Dole) (1991); id. at H9548 (statement of
Rep. Hyde).
200 137 CONG. REC. 515,478; id. at H9548.
"I 137 CONG. REC. 515,478; id. at H9548.
202 See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
2°0 See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
2°5 See Bales, supra note 177, at 1898.
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resentative Hyde's memoranda may not represent the intent of all in
Congress, they do indicate that the conferees were aware of the recent
Supreme Court decision.'w One commentator has suggested that if
Congress had intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of ADA
claims after Gilmer, it would have done so expressly in the text of the
statute.'" Another commentator has noted that Congress traditionally
used textual encouragement of arbitration to signal courts following
American Safety that it intended a statute to be arbitrable.m Under this
rationale, textual encouragement alone could be adequate justification
for inferring a congressional intent in favor of compulsory arbitra-
tion.209
Finally, even though some statements in the legislative history may
weigh against binding arbitration, a court should not give those state-
ments decisive weight. The Supreme Court has appeared reluctant to
determine congressional intent from legislative history alone in this
area.21 ° In McMahon, for example, the Court indicated an unwilling-
ness to rely on legislative history when it ordered arbitration of '34 Act
claims despite a Conference Report that clearly expressed Congress's
intent that the Wilko v. Swan anti-arbitration approach contro1. 2" As
the legislative history of the ADA appears even less clear and less
probative than that of the '34 Mt, courts should not rely on it to infer
a congressional intent against compulsory arbitration.
B. The Underlying Framework
Courts also should not infer a congressional intent against com-
pulsory arbitration from the ADA's underlying framework. 212 Although
one of the ADA's purposes is to ensure that the federal government
plays a central role in enforcing the standards established by the Act, 2 ' 3
the ADA incorporates by reference the remedial scheme of Tide VI/214
and provides for a system of overlapping remedies. 215 Under this
2°6 Id.
207 Id.
208 See Abrams, supra note 39, at 533.
(13 See id.
210 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 237-38 (1987).
211 See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
212 One commentator has argued that Garner makes it virtually impossible, as a practical
matter, to establish inherent conflict under the congressional intent standard, and that unless a
statute's text or legislative history clearly establishes an exception to the FAA mandate, claims
under the statute will almost inevitably be found arbitrable. See Abrams, supra note 39, at 551.
213 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (3) (1994).
214 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994).
215/d.
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scheme, a plaintiff must file a charge with any existing state antidis-
crimination agency before filing with the federal antidiscrimination
agency (the EEOC) and before filing suit in federal court. 216 The
purpose of this requirement is to give state agencies an opportunity to
resolve problems of employment discrimination and thereby make
resort to federal relief unnecessary. 217 Compelling arbitration before
allowing an employee to file suit in federal court is entirely consistent
with this approach. The existence of overlapping state and federal
remedies, and judicial and administrative remedies, suggests that Con-
gress did not view an employee's right to a federal forum as absolute
and that it favored the use of more expeditious local proceedings.
Some commentators have argued that compulsory arbitration is
inconsistent with the ADA's framework because arbitral awards do not
have precedential value and therefore will not appreciably deter future
discriminatory conduct nor provide guidelines for appropriate em-
ployer behavior. 218 The Supreme Court's rejection of this argument
with respect to compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims in the commer-
cial context, however, applies similarly to arbitration of ADA claims in
the labor context. 219 Voluntary settlement agreements have no prece-
dential value, but clearly they are not inconsistent with the ADA's
framework.'" Moreover, courts will still issue decisions, because not all
litigants are bound by arbitration agreements. 221 Finally, because labor
arbitrators issue written opinions detailing the reasoning behind their
awards, labor arbitration awards actually would have more value in the
development of the law than would commercial arbitration awards. 222
216 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) to -5(f) (1988). A charging party must normally wait at least 180
days from filing with the EEOC before undertaking judicial proceedings. ZIMMER ET AL., supra
note 6, at 951-52. Within those 180 days the EEOC will investigate the charge to determine
whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true. Id. If the EEOC finds no
reasonable cause, it must dismiss the charge and notify the charging party, who may then bring
a private action. Id. If the EEOC does find reasonable cause, it is directed first to attempt
conciliation. Id. If that fails, the EEOC may bring a civil suit in federal district court. Id. Where
the EEOC brings such suit, the charging party loses the right to bring suit, but has a statutory
right to intervene to protect his or her interests. Id. at 952. If the EEOC has not acted within the
180 days, the charging party may demand a "right to sue letter" and then bring a private cause
of action. Id. at 987.
2 " Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755 (1979) (descrihing purpose of similar
provision in ADEA).
2 IR Wendy S. Tien, Compulsory Arbitration of ADA Claims: Disabling the Disabled, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 1443, 1471 (1993).
219 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1991); see also supra
notes 167-69 and accompanying text
2211 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
221
	 id.
222 Interview with Joan G. Dolan, Arbitrator and Professor of Arbitration, at Boston College
Law School, Newton, Mass. (Apr. 18, 1995).
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Although labor arbitrators' opinions would not have the precedential
value of a court or agency decision, 223 an arbitrator's reasoning could
be useful for subsequent courts and employers facing ADA issues.
Furthermore, an argument against arbitration based on the need
for judicial precedent is especially unpersuasive with respect to the
ADA. The ADA is unique in that its "reasonable accommodation"
requirement focuses on equal opportunity for disabled persons rather
than on equal treatment. 224 Resolution of ADA issues requires a more
case by case, fact-specific analysis than resolution of issues under any
other employment discrimination statute. 225 Implementing the stand-
ard of "reasonable accommodation," for example, requires assessing
both the resources unique to each employer and the dynamic unique
to each shop floor."' Regulations to the ADA state that:
Whether a particular accommodation will impose an undue
hardship for a particular employer is determined on a case
by case basis. Consequently, an accommodation that poses an
undue hardship for one employer at a particular time may
not pose an undue hardship for another employer, or even
for the same employer at another time. 227
Determining whether a disabled employee can be "safely" inte-
grated into the employment environment will involve a similarly
fact-driven analysis.229 According to the EEOC Handbook to the
ADA, determining whether a disabled person will pose a direct
threat to other employees requires an individualized assessment and
should not be based on generalized truisms about the disability in
question.229 Thus, assessing a disabled person's abilities requires an
independent review of that person's unique condition and should
not be based on precedent, even where a prior litigant was diag-
nosed with the same type of disability. 230
223 Id.
2'24 ZIMMER ET AL., Sttpra note 6, at 743.
225 See id.
226 See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (1995).
227 Id.
228 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(6) (1994); U.S. Nom, EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM O N & U.S.
DEPT OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK 1-47 (1992) [hereinafter ADA
HANDBOOK].
229 ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 228, at 1-47; see also Joan G. Dolan, ADA Effect, Arbitration of
Health-Related Issues, with Special Reference to the ADA, in ARBITRATION 1994: CONTROVERSY AND
CONTINUITY, PROCEEDINGS OP THE 47TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS
42, 54-55, (Gruenberg ed., BNA Books, 1994).
23U See ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 228, at 1-47; Dolan, supra note 229.
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In sum, the ADA passes the test prescribed by the Supreme Court
for determining statutory arbitrability. Courts should not infer a con-
gressional intent against arbitration from the ADA's text, legislative
history or underlying framework. The next Section will argue that in
addition to being consistent with congressional intent, compulsory
arbitration of ADA claims offers many advantages.
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION
The litigation system in this country would benefit greatly if more
ADA issues could be resolved in a private forum. Civil filings in federal
district court increased last year to 228,162, marked by a 25% increase
in employment related charges." The EEOC received a record-break-
ing number of charges, highlighted by a 23.5% increase in disability-
related claims. 232 The number of cases now awaiting investigation by
the EEOC has risen to nearly 97,000. 2" As the number of cases filed
in the courts and agencies increases, employees must wait longer and
longer for vindication of their rights in these traditional forums.
In contrast to litigation, arbitration can save employees consider-
able time, expense and trouble. 234 Art employee asserting an ADA claim
in court might have to wait three to five years before having the claim
resolved,235 whereas arbitral resolution normally occurs in a matter of
mon ths. 236 An employee asserting an ADA right in court would incur
substantial legal fees and court costs. In arbitration, conversely, the
union bears the entire expense. 237 Whereas bureaucratic filing require-
ments, time lines and procedures would burden an employee asserting
an ADA right in court, arbitration is comparatively informal and has-
sle-free. 238 Finally, a disabled employee litigating an ADA claim in court
would subject him- or herself to public examination and potential
embarrassment. In arbitration, by contrast, the employee could keep
matters private and confidential.2"
251 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATisTics
2-3 (1993).
232 XVI JUDICIAL/LEGISLATIVE WATCH REPORT No. 3, at 6 (1995).
219
234 See ELKOURI Sc ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 7.
235
	 with Dolan, supra note 222.
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 9.
237 Interview with Dolan, supra note 222. The employee's union dues normally entitles him
or her to representation in grievance proceedings. Id.
238 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 7.
239 Interview with Dolan, supra note 222.
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Where an arbitration leads to final resolution, both the employee
and the system benefit from a significantly cheaper and more expedi-
tious resolution of the claim. Evidence shows that there is a strong
probability an arbitral proceeding will lead to final resolution of the
claim.244 The most comprehensive empirical study done on this issue
found that of 1761 arbitration awards involving Title VII issues, em-
ployees subsequently litigated the discrimination claims in 307 cases
and obtained a result different than the arbitration award in only
twenty-one cases. 241
In addition to its potential for providing a final resolution of an
ADA claim, arbitration may actually lead to a better resolution of the
claim than would a judicial proceeding."' Arbitrators have experience
in crafting suitable remedies for disputes in the workplace and are
more likely to understand the nuances of the employer/union rela-
tionship than would a judge. 243 Arbitration, therefore, would be more
likely than litigation to lead to reinstatement and other imaginative
remedies for accommodating disabled employees into the shop envi-
ronment.'" An arbitrator's experience in devising remedies for parties
in an ongoing bargaining relationship would be particularly beneficial
for disabled employees seeking accommodation from employers with
whom they will have an ongoing working relationship. 245
Even where an employee intends to bring an action in court
notwithstanding the outcome of arbitration, the benefits involved in
crossing the arbitration "hurdle" far outweigh any burdens. A court
deciding an ADA claim after an arbitration will benefit from the arbi-
trator's findings of fact and interpretations of collective bargaining
agreement provisions that bear on resolution of the statutory claims. 246
In contrast to Title VII rights, which the Gardner-Denver Court said "can
form no part of the collective-bargaining process,"247 Congress clearly
240 See Michele Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, The Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances
in the Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, Aux. J., Sept. 1984, at 49, 55.
241 Id.
242 See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 747-48 (1981) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); Stephen W. Skrainka, The Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employment Manuals
and Collective Bargaining Agreements for Resolving Civil Rights, Age and ADA Claims, 37 Sr. Louis
U. U. 985, 991 (1993).
243 See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 747-48; Skrainka, supra note 242, at 991.
244 See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 747-48; Skrainka, supra note 242, at 991.
245 See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 747-48; Skrainka, supra note 242, at 991.
246 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1973) (suggesting that courts
could accord arbitral determinations great weight especially on factual issues); Dolan, supra note
229, at 48 (suggesting that arbitral findings of fact could be used, perhaps through stipulation or
as a form of discovery, to significantly shorten the length of the trial).
247 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51.
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envisioned ADA rights to be integral to the collective bargaining proc-
ess.'" The ADA explicitly prohibits an employer from participating in
a collective bargaining agreement that has the effect of subjecting an
otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee to the dis-
crimination prohibited by the Act.'" Both the Senate and House Re-
ports to the ADA actually advise that employers and unions negotiate
their collective bargaining agreement with a provision permitting the
employer to take all actions necessary to comply with the ADA.'"
As the arbitrator is the only person authorized to interpret the
collective bargaining agreement, to the extent that resolution of an
ADA claim requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, resolution of an ADA claim requires the input of an arbitrator. 25 '
The Senate Report to the ADA indicates that a collective bargaining
agreement could be relevant in determining whether a given accom-
modation is reasonable. 252 The House Report contains language iden-
tical to that of the Senate Report and adds that if a collective bargain-
ing agreement lists job duties, the agreement could be relevant in
determining whether a given task is an essential function of the job.'"
Interpretive guidelines to the ADA indicate that a collective bargaining
agreement may be relevant in determining whether a proposed accom-
modation constitutes an undue hardship for the employer. 254
An arbitrator's input would also be helpful where compliance with
the ADA potentially conflicts with compliance with the NLRA or the
collective bargaining agreement negotiated thereunder.'" Unilateral
implementation of an accommodation to comply with the ADA, for
example, might alter the terms and conditions of employment within
the bargaining unit or might constitute "direct dealing" between the
employer and the disabled employee, both of which the NLRA gen-
erally prohibits. 256 A proposed accommodation also might adversely
affect the rights of other bargaining unit members, such as when
248 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(6)(2) (1994).
249 Id.
250 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1989); H.R. REF'. No. 485(I1), 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346.
25L See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
252 S. REP. No. 116, supra note 250, at 32.
258 See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note '250, at 63, 7eprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 303, 345.
254 29 C.F.R. app. § I630.15(d) (1995).
255 See Rose Daly-Rooney, Reconciling Conflicts Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and
the National Labor Relations Act to Accommodate People with Disabilities, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 387
(1994) (offering a detailed description of these conflicts).
256 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a) (5), (d) (1994).
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accommodating a disabled employee would conflict with the seniority
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 257 Although most
commentators agree that Congress intended to subordinate collective
bargaining agreement provisions to provisions of the ADA, in many
cases it would be possible to devise reasonable accommodations that
comply with both. 258 As the arbitrator is the only person authorized to
interpret the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator's input
would be instrumental in devising such accommodations. 259
 Thus, to
the extent that the ADA is integrated into the collective bargaining
process, it has a natural potential to become integrated with arbitra-
tion.260
In sum, the substantial advantages of compelling arbitration of
ADA claims far outweigh any burdens which might be experienced by
an employee preferring to go directly to court. Where the arbitration
produces a result acceptable to the employee, all parties benefit from
a faster, cheaper and potentially better resolution of the claim. Where
the employee elects to pursue a claim in court following the arbitra-
tion, all involved benefit from the arbitral findings of fact and inter-
pretation of collective bargaining agreement provisions.
IV. RECONCILING COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
WITH GARDNER-DENVER
Despite the advantages of arbitration of ADA claims, courts may
be disinclined to order arbitration in the labor context because of
the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Gardner
-Denver and its prog-
257 See generally Eric H.J. Stahlut, Playing the Trump Card: May an Employer Refuse to Reason-
ably Accommodate Under the ADA by Claiming a Collective Bargaining Obligation?, 9 LAB. LAW. 71
(1995). Seniority, the length of continuous service of an employee with an employer, is used to
rank employees for various employment actions. Seniority provisions are found in the vast
majority of collective bargaining agreements.
258 See generally Mary K. O'Melveny, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements: Reasonable Accommodations or Irreconcilable Conflicts?, 82 Ky. LJ. 219, 240 (1994);
Erika F. Rottenberg, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Erosion of Collective Rights?, 14 BERKELEY
J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 179 (1993). Under the Rehabilitation Act, most courts have found compliance
with collective bargaining agreements to be a full defense to violating the Rehabilitation Act. See
B. Glenn George, Americans with Disabilities Act and Civil Rights: Effect on Arbitration, in ARBI-
TRATION 1993: ARBITRATION AND THE CHANGING WORLD OF WORK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 46TH
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, 138-139 (Gruenberg, ed., BNA Books,
1993).
259 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
260 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) ("For
arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the
collective bargaining process itself.").
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eny.261
 Courts might view the reasoning used by Gardner-Denver in
rejecting deferral to arbitration 262
 as weighing similarly against compul-
sory arbitration under the scheme proposed in this Note. 2" Gardner-
Denver's assertion that Tide VII rights are legally independent from
rights guaranteed under a collective agreement, for example, might
seem to weigh against ordering arbitration of an ADA right under the
provision of a collective agreement. 264 Courts might also decide that,
despite the development of the law in the commercial context, the
hostility toward arbitration expressed by the Gardner-Denver. Court re-
tains validity in the labor context.'" Courts might see the Supreme
Court's distinction of Gilmer from Gardner-Denver as a signal that they
should not follow Gilmer in the labor context. 266 This Section argues
that courts should not view Gardner-Denver as a bar to compulsory
arbitration of ADA claims.
As a threshold matter, compulsory arbitration is not inconsistent
with the narrow holdings in the Gardner-Denver line of cases.267 Under
the Gardner
-Denver theory, an employee asserting a statutory claim has
a right to de novo judicial review notwithstanding prior submission of
his claim to arbitration, 266 Requiring an employee to arbitrate before
filing suit does not deny the employee access to a judicial forum, it
only postpones that access to give the parties' own dispute resolution
machinery a chance to succeed. 269 To the extent that Gardner-Denver
was grounded in a fear of denying an employee access to a judicial
forum, therefore, courts should not follow it to reject compulsory
arbitration under the mechanism proposed in this Note.
261 See supra notes 93-147 and accompanying text.
262 To avoid confusion this Note uses "deferral" to refer to a court accepting an arbitral
decision after arbitration has taken place, and 'deferment" to refer to a court refusing to hear a
claim until an arbitrator has ruled on it. This use of terms is consistent with NLRB usage. See
Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486,1490. (D.C. Cir. 1991).
265 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36,55-58 (1991).
264 See id. at 50,54.
265 See id. at 56-58.
266 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,56 (1991).
267 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 49.
268 See id.
269 The NLRB employs a similar policy of "deferment" to arbitration where an employee
charges both a breach of the collective bargaining agreement and an unfair labor practice under
the NLRA. Hammontree, 925 F.2d at 1490-91. The NLRB refuses to hear unfair labor practice
charges until the parties have exhausted the grievance machinery of the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. In Hammontree, the D.C. Circuit explained that "Idieferment does not diminish
fan employee's] right to a public forum; it merely delays it." 925 F.2d at 1497 & n.23. In holding
that Gardner-Denver's reasoning was not a bar to its deferment policy, however, the Hammontree
court did note that even if it were, it would not be dispositive because of the differences between
Tide VII and the NLRA. Id. at 1497-98 & n.25.
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Furthermore, developments in the commercial context have sub-
stantially invalidated Gardner
-Denver's reasoning. 27" Gardner-Denver's
analysis of Title VII's statutory framework, for example, no longer has
precedential value. The Gardner-Denver Court had reasoned that Title
VII was not subject to binding arbitration because it found nothing in
Title VII's enforcement scheme to suggest that a prior arbitral award
would foreclose an individual's right to sue. 271 Essentially, the Court
presumed that the statute was not subject to arbitration and looked for
something in the framework to rebut that presumption. 272 Under pre-
sent doctrine, however, the Court does the reverse: it presumes arbi-
trability unless it can find a congressional intent to the contrary. 275
Under the current approach the Circuit Courts of Appeals have unan-
imously held Title VII arbitrable in the commercial context. 274 The
ADA adopts the enforcement scheme of Title VII, and, as demon-
strated above, would pass the Supreme Court's current test for deter-
mining arbitrability. 275 To the extent that Gardner-Denver was based on
outdated methods of statutory analysis, therefore, courts should not
follow its reasoning to reject compulsory arbitration of the ADA.
Moreover, Gardner-Denver's distinction of NLRA rights from Title
VII rights on the ground that Title VII rights are "not subject to
prospective waiver," lacks justification after Gilmer. 276
 Gardner-Denver's
reasoning was based on Wilko v. Swan and the notion that certain
procedural infirmities of arbitration meant that agreeing to submit a
right to arbitral vindication amounted to a waiver of that right. 277
 The
Supreme Court has explicitly overruled this notion in the commercial
context.278
The increasing judicial acceptance of arbitration in the commer-
cial context should apply similarly in the labor context. The Gardner-
Denver Court had explained that because labor arbitrators were com-
petent in the law of the shop, not the law of the land, arbitrators were
ill-equipped to interpret and apply statutory language.27" Competency
in the law of the shop, however, would be highly useful in interpreta-
270
 See supra text accompanying notes 44-80,
271 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 47.
272 See id,
273 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
274 See Bales, supra note 177, at 1896, nn. 214-18.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 182-230.
276
 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51-52.
277 Id.
279 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481, 486
(1989).
279
 Gardner-Denver, 415 U,S. at 57.
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don and application of the ADA. To be "qualified" under the ADA, for
example, an employee with a disability must be able to perform the
"essential functions" of a position. 280 Determining job functions is a
traditional subject of arbitration, making an arbitrator equally if not
better equipped than a judge to make determinations of "essential
functions" of a job. 281
The ADA also does not require an employer to accommodate an
employee if doing so would create "undue hardship. "282 An arbitrator,
especially one familiar with the parties' bargaining history and the
extent of an employer's resources, would be equally if not better able
than a judge to make determinations as to "undue hardship." 2" More-
over, an arbitrator would be in a good position to gauge the effect an
accommodation would have on the other workers. 284 Regulations to the
ADA provide that the restructuring of a job that results in undue
disruption of coworkers may constitute undue hardship. 2" An arbitra-
tor competent in the practices of the industry and the interrelationship
of jobs in the shop would appear extremely well-qualified to make such
determinations.286
Furthermore, nothing prevents arbitrators from being competent
in both the law of the shop and the provisions of select statutes. The
EEOC, state agencies, or the National Academy of Arbitrators ("NAA")
could keep rosters of arbitrators specially trained in ADA issues. Cur-
rently, many arbitrators are already deciding ADA claims and are train-
ing to acquire better expertise at applying the statute. 287
The Gardner-Denver Court had also suggested that because a labor
arbitrator's role is to effectuate the intent of the parties, not the intent
of enacted legislation, an arbitrator would be compelled to apply the
agreement rather than the statute in situations where the two were
incompatible. 288 Even if one accepts the validity of this assertion, 289
2" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
281 See jamesf. Kelley, Arbitration of Health-Related Issues: ADA Effect, Management Perspective,
in ARBITRATION 1994: CONTROVERSY AND CONTINUITY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 47TH ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 63, 73 (Gruenberg, ed., BNA Books, 1994),
282 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b) (5) (A) (1994).
288 See Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at 582.
284 See id.
285 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (1995).
286
 See Warrior es' Gulf, 365 U.S. at 582.
287 See generally Dolan, supra note 229. One speech at the most recent meeting of the NAA,
for example, examined the use of medical testimony in ADA claims and explored some ap-
proaches for arbitrators in analyzing this testimony. See id. at 52-56.
288 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-57.
2" See generally David E. Feller, Arbitration and the External Law Revisited, 37 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 973 (1993). This assertion is only valid if one agrees that an arbitrator is confined to
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under the proposed mechanism, courts would not compel arbitration
where the parties did not intend for the arbitrator to decide external
law issues."' It is also likely that future collective bargaining agreements
will include a provision enabling the employer to take all steps neces-
sary to comply with the ADA."' The Gardner-Denver Court's concern
thus appears moot for practical purposes.
Finally, courts should not view the Gilmer Court's distinction of
Gardner-Denver as a reason to bar compulsory arbitration of ADA
claims. First, the Gilmer Court distinguished Gardner-Denver because
the latter was not decided under the FAA's liberal policy in favor of
arbitration. 292 Although true, this is a distinction without meaning, as
section 301 of the NLRA carries an equally liberal policy in favor of
arbitration. 293 Second, Gilmer explained that the collective bargaining
agreement did not preclude arbitration in Gardner-Denver because the
agreement expressly prohibited the arbitrator from interpreting exter-
nal law."' This distinction will have narrow applicability, however, as
collective bargaining agreements can easily be written so as not to
prohibit the arbitrator from resolving statutory claims. 295
Third, Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denver because in the labor
context there is a tension between the union's collective representation
and the individual's independent statutory rights. 296 The Gardner-Den-
ver Court had expressed concern over the union's exclusive control
over the manner and extent to which a grievance was presented,
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and prohibited from relying on external
law in reaching decisions. Id. A discussion of the merits of this assertion is beyond the scope of
this Note.
29° Under the mechanism proposed in this Note, arbitration would not be compulsory under
a collective bargaining agreement with language like the one in Gardner-Denver, which specifically
stated that the arbitrator was confined to interpretation and application of the agreement and
that the arbitrator's decision must be based "solely" upon an interpretation of the provisions of
the agreement. See 415 U.S. at 41 n.3.
291 See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 250, at 32.
292 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S, 20, 35 (1991).
292 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior Sc Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
The Mitsubishi Court actually cited Warrior &' Graf to support the development of the liberal
policy in the commercial context. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
294 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35; Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 42. The collective bargaining
agreement in Gardner-Denvercontained the typical language that the arbitrator was not to amend,
take away, add to, or change any of the provisions of the agreement. 415 U.S. at 42. The agreement
was stronger than the typical collective bargaining agreement in that it provided that "the
arbitrator's decision must be based solely upon an interpretation of the provisions or' the
Agreement. Id. at 41 n.3.
253 Drafting such contract language will undoubtedly pose a challenge for labor lawyers in
the coining years. For some recent attempts, see Skrainka, supra note 242 at 987, 1000-02.
296 See 500 U.S. at 35.
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suggesting that a union might not adequately represent an individual's
statutory rights. 297 Although a potentially valid concern, under the
scheme proposed in this Note, employees retain the option of reassert-
ing their rights in a judicial forum when the union has not represented
them adequately in arbitration. As explained above, the advantages of
arbitration outweigh any inconvenience such an employee would face
by being required to go through the arbitration process. 298
Furthermore, it is far more likely that a union would adequately
represent an ADA claimant today than it would have a Title VII claim-
ant in 1973. 29' Congress passed Title VII after a long history of invidious
discrimination by both employers and unions, and the Gardner-Denver
Court was justified in its suspicion of employer/union conspiracies
robbing an employee of his or her Title VII rights in an arbitral
proceeding."° Such a suspicion would be much less justified, however,
with respect to arbitration of ADA claims today."' Although there are
potential tensions between the ADA's prohibitions and the union's role
as a collective bargaining representative," there appears to be no
evidence that a union would not advocate as zealously for a disabled
union member as it would for a nondisabled member."' A union that
did not represent a disabled employee adequately in an arbitration
proceeding would risk being sued itself both for discrimination under
the ADA and for breach of the duty of fair representation."' Again, to
the extent that a disabled employee does not feel adequately repre-
sented by the union, the employee retains the option of reasserting
the statutory rights in a judicial setting.
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, the unique features of the ADA make it very well suited for
arbitration in the labor context. Compulsory arbitration is consistent
297 See 415 U.S. at 51-52.
298 See supra text accompanying notes 231-60.
299 See O'Melveny, supra note 258 at 220; see also Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitrators'
Decisions in Title VII Cases, 26 STAN. L. R.r:v. 421 (1974) (arguing that the main obstacle to judicial
deference to arbitration in Title VII cases is a union/employer tendency to favor discriminatory
employment practices).
313 .3ee Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger,
dissenting); see also Note, supra note 299.
3° 1 See O'Melveny, supra note 258, at 240.
3°2 See id. (offering a complete discussion of the potential conflicts between a union's duty
of fair representation to individual workers and its obligations as a collective bargaining repre-
sentative).
"3 Id.
"4 See id. at 224.
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with congressional intent and judicial precedent, and it offers sig-
nificant advantages to all parties involved. In light of the litigation crisis
facing this country, compelling arbitration of ADA claims under the
private system set up by parties to a collective bargaining agreement is
a sensible and reasonable approach.
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